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Central Bank Stress Tests: 
Mad, Bad, and Dangerous
Kevin Dowd
In my youth it was said that what was too silly to be said may
be sung. In modern economics it is put into mathematics.
—Ronald Coase
One of the most important aspects of the remarkable transforma-
tion of central banking following the onset of the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis is the growth of regulatory stress tests for the larger banks.
The relevant regulator—typically the central bank—uses these to
determine the ability of the banks to withstand stress, and uses the
results of the tests to assess the overall financial health of the bank-
ing system. A key purpose of the stress tests is to reassure the public
that the banking system is sound.
When putting banks to such a test, the relevant authority starts by
imagining some stress scenario(s) to which banks might be
exposed—these are effectively just guesses pulled from thin air—
and uses a bunch of models based on a bunch of further guesses to
determine how the scenario(s) will affect the banks’ capital ade-
quacy (i.e., their ratio of capital to assets) over the course of the
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stress period. It then passes or fails individual banks according to
whether their capital ratio has remained above some minimum by
the end of that period. To take a typical example, in its latest (2014)
stress tests, the European Central Bank (ECB) assumed a single
scenario, took the capital ratio to be the ratio of Common Equity
Tier 1 (CET1) capital to risk-weighted assets (RWA), and selected a
minimum required ratio of 5.5 percent measured in terms of the
CET1/RWA ratio. Any bank that maintained a CET1/RWA ratio of
at least 5.5 percent by the end of the stress period was then deemed
to have passed, and any bank whose capital ratio fell below this min-
imum was deemed to have failed.
These regulatory stress tests are the ultimate in the appliance of
financial “rocket science” to the banking system, and many of the
models themselves are derived from the physical science models
used so successfully in real rocket science. However, by their very
nature, all these models—the financial models and the stress tests
themselves—are impenetrable black boxes to any outsider, and we
are asked to take their reliability on trust. The analogy with rocket sci-
ence, though appealing and even comforting, then breaks down in
two critical respects:
• Real rocket science is grounded in the science of physics, and
the laws of physics are well established. By contrast, so-called
financial rocket science is merely a set of beliefs and practices
based on sets of convenient assumptions that ape some of the
assumptions made in physics, but are wide of the mark as
descriptions of how financial markets really work.
• We know that the methodology underpinning real rocket
science actually works because it is scientifically tested, but
we have no such assurance with its financial and central bank
equivalents. Indeed, going further, we can say, with confi-
dence, that we know that the methodologies underpinning
both financial models and regulatory stress tests do not
work: the stress tests provide an extremely unreliable radar
system.
My purpose in this article is to spell out this latter claim—or, more
precisely, to assess the methodology of regulatory stress testing both
by reference to first principles and by reference to its track record.
The results are shocking.
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Financial Risk Models Are Worse than Useless
The first point to appreciate is that central bank stress tests are
based on models of financial risk—models that predict potential
losses and their associated probabilities—and these models are not so
much useless as worse than useless. More precisely, the stress tests
are dependent on risk models because they make use of risk-
weighted asset measures that are dependent on the risk models.
These models are useless at predicting financial losses and worse
than useless as risk management tools because of their gameability
and the false risk comfort that they provide.
Consider the foundations of risk modeling. The first is the stan-
dard assumption that financial returns (or losses) follow a Gaussian
(or normal) distribution. A nice example illustrates that this
assumption is impossibly implausible for the large losses that really
matter. Back in August 2007, Goldman Sachs’ hedge funds were
experiencing enormous losses. “We’re experiencing 25-sigma
[standard deviation] events, several days in a row,” explained their
CFO, David Viniars (Larsen 2007), the suggestion being that
Goldman had been very unlucky as opposed, e.g, to merely being
incompetent. Financial commentators were quick to pour scorn on
this lame excuse, and 25-sigma events were being likened to events
one would expect to see on one day in 10,000 or 100,000 years.
That’s a long waiting time for events that actually happen quite fre-
quently in financial markets.
However, under the Gaussian distribution, the waiting time to
observe a single-day 25-sigma event is much, much longer than even
100,000 years. In fact, the waiting time is 1.3e^135 years: 1.3 with
135 zeros inserted after the decimal point (Dowd et al. 2008: 3). To
put this number into perspective, the number of particles in the
known universe is believed to be somewhere in the region of 1e^80,
which is literally infinitesimally smaller. To recycle an old Richard
Feynman joke, a number like 1.3e^135 is so large that the term “cos-
mological” hardly suffices; perhaps we should describe it as “econom-
ical” instead. Thus, the Gaussian distribution massively
underestimates the risks of the really big losses that truly matter. 
A second pillar of risk modeling is the Value at Risk (or VaR) risk
measure. This tells us the maximum likely loss that can occur on a
position at a certain level of probability, for example, on 99 times out
of 100. In plain English, this definition boils down to the worst we
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can do if a bad event does not occur. Unfortunately, it tells us noth-
ing about the loss we might experience if a bad event does occur—
and it is the very high losses that we should worry about; the VaR is
blind to the risks that matter, the ones that can wipe a bank out.
A third problem with the risk models is simply that they don’t
work. One could give many examples (see, e.g., Dowd 2014: 6–8),
but Figure 1 suffices. The continuous dark plot shows banks’ average
risk weight, which includes the impact of risk models; the dashed
line shows a primitive metric, bank leverage, the ratio of bank assets
to capital, which ignores risk models. The risk-weight plot suggests
that risks were continually falling; the leverage plot shows
that they were rising up to 2008. As Bank of England economist
Andrew Haldane (2011: 3) noted, “While the risk traffic lights were
FIGURE 1
Average Risk Weights and Leverage, Selected Banks,
1993–2011
Notes: The sample consists of Deutsche Bank, HSBC, BNP Paribas,
Barclays, Citigroup, UBS, BAML, BONY, Commerzbank, ING, JPM,
LBG, Santander, State Street, UniCredit, and Wells Fargo. Data are not
available for the remaining G-SIBs. The leverage ratio is defined as total
assets relative to Tier 1 capital.
Sources: Bank of England, The Banker, Bloomberg.
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flashing bright red for leverage [as the crisis approached], for risk
weights they were signalling ever-deeper green.” The risk weights
were a contrarian indicator for risk, indicating that risk was falling
when it was, in fact, increasing sharply.
There are a host of reasons why the models failed so badly, but
only one that matters: gaming. The models were being used not to
manage risks, but to game the risk-weighting system. No model can
take account of the ways in which it will be gamed, and market play-
ers have strong incentives to game the models used to control them.
So why does bad modeling persist? The reason is that banks want
bad models because they understate their risks, and the regulatory
system endorses bad models because it is captured by the banks.
Most risk modeling is then just a game: banks pretend to model
risks, but they are really gaming the risk numbers. This game even
has a name: risk-weight optimization. You fiddle with the models to
get low risk numbers and you come up with clever securitizations to
game the risk-weighting rules.1 The lower the risk number, the lower
the capital requirement, and the more capital can be siphoned off
and distributed as dividends or bonuses.
In short, the real (though seldom publicly stated) purpose of risk
modeling is to use capital regulations to decapitalize banks, and when
they go bust, the bankers play dumb and lobby for a bailout. It is per-
haps no wonder, then, that the risk models don’t work: they are not
intended to.
General Problems with Regulatory Stress Tests
Besides their dependence on risk models, stress tests carried out
by central banks or financial regulators are subject to a number of
other problems, any one of which on its own would be enough to ren-
der such exercises fatally flawed.
One problem is that these tests are essentially based on a single
scenario.2 Reliance on a single scenario violates good practice advice
on stress testing and even common sense (see Finger 2008). Even if
1A good example is the “how to destroy” securitization. The purpose of this secu-
ritization was to game the Basel capital rules to release capital and generate false
profits (Kerr 2010, 2011).
2Strictly speaking, the Fed in its Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review
(CCAR) stress tests uses three scenarios, but of these only its “extremely adverse”
scenario really matters.
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the banking system is safe under the one scenario that you consid-
ered, how do you know that it will be safe against all the other sce-
narios that you did not consider? You don’t. The odds of that scenario
actually occurring are also vanishingly small: whatever you think
might happen, something else generally does. No single scenario can
possibly give you confidence that the banking system is safe.
Another problem is that central bank stress tests are typically
undemanding, that is, insufficiently stressful. They are undemanding
in two different ways:
• The stress scenario itself is typically only a mildly adverse
 scenario.
• The hurdle (or pass rate) is (always) low, and arguably very low.
To give an analogy, a stress test is like an exam, and a tough exam
requires not only a tough exam paper but also a challenging pass
mark. Central bank stress tests are then like having an exam with an
easy set of questions and a very low pass mark.
A third fatal error with central bank stress tests is that they lack
credibility. They lack credibility in part because the regulators who
conduct them are prone to capture by bankers, who then pressure
regulators to go easy on them in much the same way that students
would pressure a weak teacher to give them an easy exam, and in part
because of central banks’ own dismal forecasting records—none of
them saw the financial crisis coming and they have all made major
forecasting errors in the period since the onset of the crisis.
Stress tests also lack credibility for another reason. Imagine that a
central bank conducted a stress test that suggested that the banking
system was very weak. The central bank could never reveal such a
result, because to do so would undermine public confidence in the
banking system and violate one of its most important tasks, which is
to maintain that confidence. Remember, too, that one of the pur-
poses of the stress tests is to promote confidence . . . whether that
confidence is justified or not presumably being a different matter.
Revealing a “bad” result would also undermine confidence in the
central bank itself, because it would raise awkward questions about
its own competence. How could the banking system be so weak after
all the resources devoted to rebuilding it, who should be held to
account, and so forth? Of course, everyone understands that the cen-
tral bank has a huge incentive to promote the message that the sys-
tem is sound, and so the tests lack credibility because only a
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reassuring answer is ever to be allowed. And, indeed, by curious coin-
cidence, central bank stress tests always report that the banking sys-
tem as a whole is sound, even if they sometimes report that individual
banks are not.
Despite the fact that the principal purpose of central bank stress
tests is to make the banking system more stable, those tests inevitably
increase systemic banking risk:
• Such tests embody a regulatory risk standard—an “approved”
way to manage risks—and any such standard is inherently coun-
terproductive. In the absence of any standardization, different
banks will have different approaches to risk management and
this diversity will help to stabilize the system, with some buying
in a crisis when others sell. But if all banks are pressured to
standardize their risk management, then they will all act in
much the same way and will all attempt to sell in a crisis.
However, while an individual bank can sell in a crisis, the entire
lot cannot. All assets have to be held by someone, and a collec-
tive attempt to sell only aggravates the crisis by exacerbating
price instability. Moreover, any regulatory standard will have
this destabilizing effect even if that standard is a good one when
applied to any individual bank on its own.
• In practice, however, any such standard must inevitably be
flawed—if only because no central bank has the incentives or
information to produce a perfect standard—and in such cases
the whole banking system will then be exposed to weaknesses
in the “approved” risk management standard, and especially to
the weaknesses in the “approved” models. They will then end
up with the same flawed models with the same risk blind spots,
and the entire system will be exposed to the dangers that the
“approved” models fail to detect.
A Record of Repeated Failures
It is also instructive—indeed, grimly entertaining—to examine the
track record of regulatory stress testing to see how this methodology
actually works in practice.
The Freddie and Fannie Stress Tests
Let’s begin with the first modern stress tests: the Fannie and
Freddie tests. Their origins go back to the early 1990s, when there
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was concern over the solvency of these government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs). There were proposals to increase their capital
requirements, but Fannie managed to head off such pressure by
means of an audacious coup. It commissioned former Fed
Chairman Paul Volcker to examine the matter, and he concluded
that Fannie was safe.
Fannie’s chief executive could then claim that his business was
safer than banking: “There are no unpleasant surprises because of the
nature of our business. We don’t have any see-through buildings, any
Third World countries or any strip shopping malls. We just have
those mortgages” (Hagerty 2013).
It then took nearly a decade for the rocket scientists to come up
with model-based capital requirements that were not much higher
than zero, and this when the GSEs were loading up on subprime
mortgages, then known as “affordable housing.” Fortunately, this was
not a problem: The models said the subprime market was actually
quite safe because modelers did not allow for any possibility of a
housing downturn and the risks were diversified away.
As the details were being finalized, Fannie then scored another
coup by commissioning a distinguished team of economists led by
Joseph Stiglitz to carry out its own stress tests. The Stiglitz
team came back with the reassuring conclusion that even under a
decade-long “nuclear winter” scenario, the probability of Fannie
or Freddie failing was essentially zero (Stiglitz, Orzag, and
Orzag 2002).
The GSEs then went on a massive binge and effectively failed six
years later when the government took them into conservatorships to
avert impending collapse. The tests had been a spectacular failure.
So what went wrong? Well, part of the problem was that the
stress-based capital requirements were way too low, but part of the
problem was that the new system allowed the GSEs to game the sys-
tem by loading up on risks that the models did not adequately cap-
ture. The GSEs’ management teams were also working with
contracts that encouraged excessive risk-taking so the outcome
should be no surprise. They were also gaming the GSEs’ govern-
ment-sponsored status: They would tell Congress not to worry
because the government was not on the hook, then tell Wall Street
not to worry because the government was on the hook. There was
also all the political meddling as well (see Morgenson and Rosner
2012). Or, to quote the book Alchemists of Loss, Fannie and Freddie
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leveraged more than would have been possible without the
government’s quasi-guarantee, used taxpayers’ money to
lobby like crazy to ensure they were not properly regulated
and collapsed thankfully into the arms of the taxpayer as soon
as the consequences of their own ineptitude became clear. It
is indeed astonishing to consider how they managed to turn
the soundest product in financial markets, the home
 mortgage, into a speculative casino, causing collateral damage
of many times their own losses [Dowd and Hutchinson
2010: 190].
And all of which was missed by the stress tests.
The Fed’s Stress Tests
The next important player to enter the stress-testing game was
the Federal Reserve. Its first stress tests were carried out under
the relatively light Supervisory Capital Assessment Program in
2009, followed by the CCAR in 2011, which has since become an
annual event.
The CCAR is a highly aggressive program in which banks are
required to prove the adequacy of their models relative to the Fed’s
models. Each CCAR has been more extensive and demanding than
the previous one. Then in 2013, the CCAR was supplemented by
additional stress tests mandated by Dodd-Frank, and in 2014 U.S.
banks were subject to even more stress tests under Basel III.
Critics pointed out that the Fed’s tests were reliant on the Fed’s
scenarios that were not particularly stressful, and were conditioned
by political factors such as the Fed’s reluctance to face up to the
problems posed by the big zombie banks and the still unresolved
problems in real estate markets. The tests were also blind to risks
credibly identified by outside observers, for example:
• The risks of a eurozone collapse were ignored until the 2012
CCAR, and the eurozone had nearly collapsed the year before.
• The CCAR still ignores the biggest risk of all—that created by
enormous off-balance sheet activities.
When I was researching Math Gone Mad, I interviewed some of
the senior managers of a major U.S. bank. They told me that much
of its normal activity had to stop because of the need to feed the
 models demanded by the Fed, and both its management and its IT
systems were overwhelmed by compliance issues. The bank was
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forced to make huge investments in models and modelers it didn’t
need, and then had to take more risks to recoup the costs. It also had
to call a halt to further acquisitions because it couldn’t assess the reg-
ulatory risks in potential purchases. Its whole business model became
warped by the models, right down to the level of individual loans.
And the models themselves couldn’t be challenged.
Banks have no choice but to manage to what they perceive the
Fed’s models to be, otherwise they fail the tests. The result is the
banks end up with much the same unreliable models, they then
make much the same mistakes, and the U.S. banking system ends
up with much greater systemic risk—a risk that none of the mod-
els pick up.
Over time, the tests also become routine and the results increas-
ingly predictable. Stress testing then becomes a meaningless but very
costly and very counterproductive compliance exercise. In fact, there
is now a flourishing consultancy industry that specializes in how to
pass the tests. The consultants are former Fed officials—the same
ones who used to conduct the stress tests themselves. The very
process of repeated stress testing over time has made the tests them-
selves futile. Put all this together, and you have lots of jobs for risk
modelers, but the net effect is a growing systemic risk that the mod-
els cannot see. But let’s not be too hard on the Fed—when it comes
to screwing up stress testing, the Fed is only an amateur. Let’s look
at other countries.3
The Icelandic Stress Tests
Consider Iceland. In 2004, the three largest Icelandic banks had
assets equal to 100 percent of GDP. They then embarked on a mas-
sive expansion and by the end of 2007 their assets were 900 percent
of GDP—a world record. credit default swap (CDS) spreads were
now suggesting that there might be a problem.
Fortunately, an IMF stress test in August 2008 suggested there
was nothing to worry about—the system was resilient. So did a bunch
of other regulatory stress tests. The banking system then collapsed
unexpectedly in October: The stress tests had missed the imminent
collapse of the entire Icelandic banking system!
3The discussion of the U.K. and European stress tests is drawn mainly from
Dowd (2015).
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The U.K. Stress Tests
Then there are the new kids on the stress-testing block, the Brits.
The first U.K. stress test was carried out last year. The message was
that the banking system was sound.
The exercise was based on a single scenario, and a mild one at that:
GDP growth falls to  3.2 percent before bouncing back, inflation
rises to peak at 6.5 percent, long-term gilts peak just below 6 percent,
and unemployment hits 12 percent. This is not particularly stressful
by historical standards, and also pales in comparison to the output
falls and unemployment rates in parts of the eurozone. The impact of
this stress scenario is also very mild: The average CET1/RWA ratio
drops a little from 10 to 7.3 percent and there is a fairly small drop in
bank profitability.
The Bank of England also uses a very low “pass” standard—a
4.5 percent minimum ratio of CET1/RWA. This is lower than the
5.5 percent ratio that the European Central Bank used in its widely
discredited 2014 stress tests, is lower than the 7 percent ratio already
in force in the United Kingdom in 2014, and is well below the mini-
mum capital requirements coming through under Basel III. Had the
Bank carried out a test using these latter Basel minima, however, the
U.K. banking system would have failed: same exercise, higher safety
standard, opposite result.
The Bank also failed to carry out any tests based on leverage—
the ratio of capital to total unweighted assets—which offers a much
less gameable measure of a bank’s financial health. Even an unde-
manding test based on the Bank’s required minimum leverage ratio
of 3 percent would have revealed how weak the U.K. banking sys-
tem really was, and most of the banks would have failed.
The Bank’s failure to test against its own minima hardly inspires
confidence. But then again, neither does the alternative. One might
say that the Bank is damned because it didn’t, and would have been
damned if it did.
A 3 percent test is the weakest of leverage ratio tests. It is lower
than the 4 percent minimum that the Fed now uses for the CCAR
and a fraction of the 15 percent–plus minimum that many experts rec-
ommend (see, e.g., Admati et al. 2010 and Admati and Hellwig 2013:
part III). The 3 percent minimum is at least five times larger than the
leverage test that the Bank failed to conduct—or, at least, to report.
Had the Bank based its stress tests on this measure, December’s
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 comforting financial headlines would have been very different
indeed. By this standard, the whole U.K. banking system would not so
much be underwater as stuck in Davy Jones’ locker at the bottom of
the ocean. We can therefore safely dismiss the U.K. stress tests.
The European Stress Tests
The European stress tests are even worse. The first of these was
carried out by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors in
2009. The outcome was uneventful: 22 large banks all passed.
European regulators were quick to hail the “resilience” of the
European banking system. Critics simply said that the stress test was
too weak.
The fun starts with the second stress test conducted in 2010. This
test covered the 91 largest European banks and only seven failed to
meet the 6 percent minimum. Their combined shortfall was only
€3.5bn—about 0.15 percent of GDP. This figure was a fraction of
the estimates of independent analysts, and the stress test largely
ignored the biggest risk of all—the risk of sovereign defaults. This
risk was ignored, it turned out, because the EU was “committed” to
ensuring that such defaults never happened—a classic case of policy
make-believe undermining the exercise from its inception. Any
doubts about its credibility were dispelled four months later when
the Irish banking system collapsed. The Irish banks had all passed the
stress test.
The 2011 stress tests were then carried out by the new European
Banking Authority (EBA). The get tough EBA promised that its
stress tests really would be credible and it would not repeat the mis-
takes of the earlier fiascos. There was now a much greater awareness
of the sovereign debt problem and the EBA needed to prove itself.
So what did it do? It came out with an aggregate shortfall of €2.5bn,
even less than the widely discredited estimate from the year before.
Any doubts about the credibility of that exercise were then dispelled
three months later when the giant bank Dexia failed. Dexia had aced
the test.
In the meantime, the EBA frantically revised its numbers. Its cor-
rected estimate turned out to be over 45 times larger than the
 original—and even this was much less than independent estimates.
Then the big Spanish bank Bankia failed; Bankia had also passed.
Then the icing on the cake—the entire Cypriot banking system
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 collapsed in early 2013; the big Cypriot banks had also passed the
test. None of the key agencies monitoring Cyprus—the EU, EBA,
IMF, and BIS—even had Cyprus on any kind of watch list. So now
the stress testers had a hat trick. Three national banking systems had
failed after being signed off as sound.
The next major EU stress tests were conducted by the ECB in
2014 as part of its new mandate as Europe’s super-regulator. A key
driver behind the establishment of the eurozone banking union and
the Single Supervisory Mechanism to govern it was the argument
that national regulators were prone to capture and therefore an
independent and more demanding regulator was required—
namely, the ECB. The ECB promised that its stress tests really
would be credible and it would not repeat the mistakes of the ear-
lier stress-test fiascos. The ECB stress test was also to be buttressed
by an asset quality review (AQR) to provide assurance that the new
stress tests would be based on sound data given the glaring data
problems that had plagued earlier stress tests. The new tests were
also to have a stronger capital standard, an 8 percent CET1/RWA
hurdle ratio—the standard minimum of 4.5 percent, plus a 2.5 per-
cent CCB, plus a 1 percent G-SII requirement. Unfortunately, the
8 percent ratio soon attracted a lot of negative lobbying from inter-
ested parties—the banks and their national supervisors, who had
been captured by them—and the hurdle ratio was eventually
knocked down to 5.5 percent.
Twenty-five banks then failed the stress test with a combined
shortfall of €25 billion. None of the biggest banks failed, and the
banks that did fail were concentrated mainly in the southern fringe.
For its part, the asset quality review produced asset quality adjust-
ments of an additional €48 billion. The severity of the stress is appar-
ent when one considers that the combined shortfall plus quality
adjustment amounted to only about 0.3 percent of total bank assets,
a number small enough to be rounding error. One wonders why they
bothered. In any case, a chorus of experts dismissed the results on
publication.
One problem was the adverse scenario, which was very mild. This
scenario assumed that inflation would drop to 1 percent in 2014. But
by the time the results were released inflation had fallen well below
this level and much of the eurozone was already in deflation. When
challenged about this at the press conference, ECB Vice President
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Constancio’s response makes satire redundant: “The scenario of
deflation is not there because . . . we don’t consider that deflation is
going to happen,” he said.
Independent experts estimated shortfalls nearly 30 times larger
than the ECB’s estimates (Acharya and Steffen 2014a, 2014b,
Vestergaard and Retana 2013). These assessments are superior
because they use standardized, easily replicable low-cost approaches
and are credible because they are independent of the political influ-
ences and regulatory capture that compromise central bank stress
tests.
Independent studies also suggest that the biggest risks are in the
French and German banks, directly contrary to the ECB party line
that the core eurozone banks are sound and that any problems lie pri-
marily around the southern fringe.
The main reason for the discrepancy between their results and the
ECB’s is that they used leverage ratios that revealed the risks rather
than RWA ratios that hid them. The implication is that these banks
only appear strong because of their superior expertise in gaming the
risk weights.
Consider the big French and German banks, Credit Agricole,
BNP Paribas, SocGen and Deutsche.4 Each of these
• easily passed the ECB stress test,
• would easily have failed an undemanding 3 percent leverage
ratio test,
• would produce enormous shortfalls under a severe (7 percent)
leverage ratio test, and
• had very low ratios of risk weighted to total assets.
In sum, these banks are more risky, but better at making their risks
invisible to the ECB test.
4Deutsche is a particular problem child. It is arguably the largest, most systemat-
ically important bank in the world, with a total balance sheet about the same size
as world GDP. With deposits only 1 percent of its balance sheet, it is a gigantic
hedge fund with a comparatively small bank attached. FDIC Vice Chairman
Thomas Hoenig has been warning about it for years; two years ago, he noted: “It’s
horrible, I mean they’re horribly undercapitalized. They have no margin of
error.” Recent investigations by the New York Fed also indicate a litany of seri-
ous problems in its U.S. arm, indicative of the firm worldwide. These include
shoddy reporting, inadequate auditing and oversight, and weak technology sys-
tems, amounting to a “systemic breakdown” in controls (see Enrich, Strasbourg,
and Henning 2014). Deutsche is, in short, a disaster waiting to happen.
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It would therefore appear that that the stress tests had been driven
and hence compromised by the desire not to offend powerful
 governments—especially Germany and France—who also had their
own reasons to want test results suggesting that the problems lay on
the fringes of the eurozone, and not right at its heart. That same mes-
sage would have also suited the empire-builders at the ECB to rein-
force the case for giving them yet more power. In any case, it would
have suited no one for the ECB to suggest that some of Europe’s too-
big-to-fail banks were, well, on the verge of failure, as that would
have put the spotlight on them to come up with a solution to this
most vexing of problems. And so the
suspicion lingers that undertaking the comprehensive assess-
ment on the basis of risk-weighted assets and an only mildly
adverse stress scenario were not “mistakes,” after all. More
likely, it reflects substantial political pressures. It would have
required courage and genuine independence for the ECB to
identify several German and French banks as severely under-
capitalized just days before it assumes bank supervisory respon-
sibilities for all major eurozone banks [Vestergaard 2014].
In short, the ECB had been captured and its stress tests were no
more credible than its predecessors’ had been.
Conclusion
The inescapable conclusion is that the methodology of regulatory
stress testing is based on foundations that are indefensible and even
risible. These include:
• Their dependence on discredited models of financial risk;
• Their reliance on a single scenario, against all good practice and
common sense;
• Their tendency to rely on unstressful stress scenarios and very
low pass marks;
• Their intrinsic lack of credibility because of regulatory capture,
central banks’ own dismal forecasting records, and the politics
that underlie and fatally undermine regulatory regulatory stress
exercises; and
• Their reliance on “approved” models and risk management
practices that increase systemic risk—and do so in a way that
the models themselves cannot see.
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If this does not persuade, consider their track record, which
includes, among other embarrassing disasters, the hideously
costly Fannie and Freddie stress-test fiasco and three national
banking systems signed off as sound by regulatory stress tests,
which then collapsed unexpectedly not long afterwards. In fact,
with one exception, I am not aware of a single case in which a reg-
ulatory stress test correctly identified in advance a subsequent
buildup of banking stress, which then allowed the relevant
authorities the chance to counter it. The exception? The
Northern Rock “war games” in the United Kingdom in 2005. This
exercise identified a scenario very close to that which was to lead
to the Northern Rock run in 2007—the first English bank run
since 1866—but then the British authorities did nothing about it
and were caught completely unprepared when their own scenario
came to pass.
In not a single case did a regulatory stress exercise ever lead to any
demonstrated benefit to the banking system. On the other hand,
there are many cases where such exercises provided false comfort,
lulling those involved to sleep in the face of imminent danger.
Ironically, they generally did so when more conventional
 indicators—such as CDS or yield spreads, and leverage and other
ratios—were clearly indicating red. But the stress tests said not to
worry. So they didn’t and then disaster struck.
Stress tests operate like a cancer detection procedure that can’t
identify most cancers, or a radar system that cannot see many of
the hazards out there. We would never send out a ship or plane
that relied on a radar that didn’t work; we really shouldn’t allow
central banks or bank regulators to do the same with our banking
systems either.
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